These notes are not written in order to draw a judgement on fascism from the recent sensational events in Rome, but rather they stem from the conclusion of the Fascist Congress – even if this has only served to prove itself superfluous for forming a critical judgement of fascism.[1]
The Fascist movement brought to the Congress the baggage of a powerful organisation, and while it aimed to make a spectacular public display of this in the capital city, it also took on the attitude of wanting to lay the foundations of its programmatic ideology before the public eye. Its leaders imagined they had this duty: to provide such a well-developed organisation with the justification of a doctrine and a «new» political direction.
The Fascist losses that can be drawn from the days of the general strike in Rome are trivial in comparison to those that emerge from the results of the Congress, in light of what we have said. It is evident that any explanation – or, if one prefers, justification – of Fascism must be sought outside this attempt at new programmatic constructions, which ended in nothing, both as a collective endeavour and as the personal attempt of a leader who will not succeed in becoming a «master», even if he unfailingly follows the path of a «politician» in the most unfortunately traditional sense of the term.
Fascism – this futurism of politics – has not risen by even a millimetre above the utterly vulgar level of bourgeois political mediocrity. Why?
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The Congress, it has been said, boils down to Mussolini’s speech. That speech is an abortion. From the analysis of the other parties, it did not progress in any way towards a synthesis from which the distinct position of a Fascist party, as opposed to all others, might emerge. Above all, it remained unclear what new position Fascism takes with regard to the traditional political ideologies of the bourgeois parties, once it has, in some way, managed to place itself in a posture of proud hostility towards socialism and the workers’ movement.
The attempt to present an ideology draped in Fascist colours, rich in destructive critiques of old patterns – often, and especially, in the form of dazzling paradoxes – resulted in a series of statements that were neither new in themselves nor bound together in any sort of novel synthesis. They merely chewed over, with no real effect, themes from political polemics that had already been tossed back and forth between one school and another, and cooked in every possible sauce by the morbid mania for constant innovation that afflicts the petty politicians of contemporary bourgeois decadence. Thus, instead of a solemn proclamation of a new truth – and what is said of Mussolini’s speech can be said of the entire Fascist literature – we were presented with a catalogue of all the cultural bacteria that thrive in the putrid fermentation of bourgeois ideology. In this age of a regime’s supreme crisis, it has given itself over to morbid exercises built on formulas snatched from syndicalism, from more or less individualist anarchism, from the ruins of spiritualist and religious metaphysics – from everything except, fortunately, our horrifying and brutal Bolshevik Marxism.
Indeed, what conclusion can be drawn from a welter of incoherent theses, such as those of Masonic anticlericalism, brought up to deny the programme of the Popular Party, while simultaneously benefiting from certain coefficients of militant religiosity – or those of economic liberalism displayed openly to bury under «capitalist reality» the futile attempts at collectivism, while on the other hand lighting candles to the doctrine of political liberalism? What does it mean to claim agreement with communism’s anti-democratic notion of dictatorship, when that dictatorship is nothing but the restriction of the «free» capitalist economy, which declares itself more vital than ever? And meanwhile boasting of the republic while flashing prospects of a pre-parliamentary, dictatorial, and therefore ultra-dynastic regime; or even opposing to the doctrine of the so-called Liberal Party that of the historical right, which was in theory and practice no more than a more serious or intimate liberalism?
If from all these statements there had emerged a conclusion that arranged them into a harmonious result, they would still remain in their contradictions with the force of the paradoxes with which every new ideology cloaks itself, almost as if to demonstrate its vigour and solidity through some dialectical virtuosity. But in this case, the final synthesis was missing, and that whole jumble of old tales yields nothing but a disappointing outcome.
The critical point was to define Fascism’s position in relation to the parties of the central bourgeois bloc. For better or worse, there was at least something with which to position itself as an opponent of the Socialist Party and of the Popular Party; but the rejection of the Liberal Party – and the necessity of killing it off in order to replace it somehow – could not be decently theorised or translated into a party programme. Let us be clear: this is not meant as support for the claim that Fascism cannot become a party – as in fact it will, skilfully reconciling its bizarre aversions to the monarchy, to parliamentary democracy, and even… to state socialism. All this merely shows us a movement that possesses a truly effective and strong organisation – which, besides being military, can also perfectly well be political and electoral – but which lacks a programmatic ideology of its own. Our examination of the Fascist Congress – and with it, Mussolini’s speech, in which the effort to produce a self-definition was at its peak – allows us to conclude that Fascism is incapable of defining itself. And this fact, which proves instead that we are in an excellent position to define it ourselves, finds itself logically situated on the path of our analytical critique.
• • •
The word ideology is somewhat metaphysical, but we use it to mean the ideological baggage of a movement – its awareness of a set of goals to be achieved through action. Naturally, all of this entails a method of interpreting and understanding the facts of social life and history. We make this preliminary point to say that the bourgeoisie, in the present age – precisely because it is a class in decline at the end of its historical life – has a split ideology: its outward programmes no longer correspond to its inner consciousness, its real interests, or the actions it undertakes to defend itself. When the bourgeoisie was a revolutionary class, it possessed in full force the «consciousness» of the social and political ideology proper to it – the one we wish to call by the name of that liberalism which Fascism now proclaims itself come to uproot. The bourgeoisie believed and willed in accordance with the tablets of the liberal or democratic programme: its urgent interest was to liberate the formation of its economic system from the fetters of the laws and constitutions of the ancien régime, and it was convinced that the realisation of a manifesto of political liberty – the granting of every possible right and faculty to the lowest citizen – coincided not only with the universal humanism of its philosophy, but also with the fullest development of its economic life.
And in fact, bourgeois liberalism – while it was an excellent political weapon for making the State the supreme executor of the feudal economy and of the privileges of the first two «Estates» – was also a not insignificant instrument through which the «class» function of the bourgeois parliamentary State could be exercised not only against the past and its restorations, but also against the manifestations of the «Fourth Estate» and the assaults of the proletarian movement. It was precisely the awareness of this second function of democracy – of its historical about-face, its transformation from a revolutionary force into a conservative one – that was lacking in the early phase of bourgeois life and, if you will, in the historical Right of Italy, by way of example. The ideologists of liberalism not only «said» but also «believed» that this method of constituting the political apparatus was for the benefit of the entire people, and that it created a level playing field of rights for all members of society. They had not yet conceived that, in order to preserve the bourgeois institutions of which they were the spokesmen, it might become necessary to tear up the liberal guarantees written into political doctrine and bourgeois constitutions. The enemy of the State could only be the enemy of all – the criminal, the violator of the social contract.
Subsequently, it becomes clear to the ruling class that the democratic regime also serves as an excellent «safety valve» for the excessive pressure of proletarian economic discontent, and the bourgeoisie becomes increasingly convinced that the liberal mechanism serves its class interests brilliantly. It now perceives it only as a means, not as a doctrinal or abstract end in itself, and comes to understand that the use of this means is by no means incompatible with the integrative function of the bourgeois State – including the violent repression of the proletarian movement. A liberal State that must tear up the guarantees of liberty in order to defend itself from attack stands as historical proof of the falsehood of liberal doctrine, both as an interpretation of the bourgeoisie’s historical mission and of the nature of its apparatus of government. Its true purpose comes to light: to defend the interests of capitalism by every means – through the diversion of democratic disguises, and with the addition of armed repression when the former is no longer sufficient to suppress any movement that dares to threaten the structure of the State itself.
But this is a «revolutionary» doctrine concerning the function of the bourgeois liberal State. Or rather, it is revolutionary to state it openly – and this is precisely why, in the current historical phase, the bourgeois class must put it into practice while denying it in theory. In order for the bourgeois State to carry out its natural repressive and counter-revolutionary function, there must therefore be an implicit dismantling of liberalism’s claim to truth as a doctrine – but there is absolutely no need to go backwards and revise the constitution of the State apparatus. The bourgeoisie is under no obligation to repent of having once been liberal, nor to abjure liberalism; it is simply the logical biological development of its system of domination that has prepared and equipped it to defend, with machine guns and prisons, the cause of «liberty».
• • •
As long as the bourgeois movement sets out programmes and formulates political doctrine, it cannot openly lay out the necessity of class defence by all means – including those theoretically excluded by the constitutions and laws of the State. That would be a disingenuous conservative manoeuvre. On the other hand, it is beyond dispute that ninety-nine out of a hundred members of the ruling class feel that it would be equally disingenuous, from a conservative standpoint, to formally repudiate the system of parliamentary democracy and call for a revision of the State apparatus in a medieval, aristocratic, or autocratic direction. Just as no pre-Napoleonic State was ever better equipped – and not just in terms of technical means – for the horrors of war than modern democratic States, so too have none ever been better equipped than these democracies for internal reaction and repression, and for the defence of their own existence.
It is therefore logical that in the current period of repression against the revolutionary movement of the working class, political activity and participation in political life by bourgeois citizens – or bourgeois clienteles – should take on new forms. The traditional «constitutional» parties, designed to extract from electoral contests and popular consultations a majority vote for the survival of the capitalist regime, are no longer sufficient. The class surrounding the State must now support its functions in line with the new requirements. The conservative and counter-revolutionary political movement must assume a role and an organisation of a military character, in anticipation of civil war. It is in the interest of the State that this formation takes place within the country, among the mass of citizens, because then the repressive functions will more easily align with the desperate defence of the illusion that the State is the common father of all citizens, of all parties, and of all classes.
Corresponding to the fact that the revolutionary method is gaining ground among the working class – preparing it for struggle and for military organisation – once it has abandoned hope in achieving emancipation through the legal means of political activity permitted by the State, the party of order organises and arms itself in self-defence.
The fact that, alongside the State and under its tacit protection, it [i.e. the party of order] manages to arm itself «faster» and «more effectively» than the proletariat, and takes the offensive against proletarian positions which the liberal-bourgeois regime had previously tolerated, must not be mistaken for the emergence of a party that is against the State in the sense of seeking to seize it in order to give it pre-liberal forms.
It is here – as the reader will have easily understood – that we find the explanation for the rise of fascism. It does not dismantle bourgeois liberalism; it completes it. Fascism realises, in the organisation that forms around the official machinery of the State, the dual defensive function carried out by the bourgeoisie.
With the intensification of the proletariat’s revolutionary pressure, the bourgeoisie will likely seek to push both of its defensive methods to the extreme – methods which are not incompatible, but operate in parallel. It will flaunt the boldest democratic and social-democratic politics, while at the same time unleashing the squads of the white military organisation to sow terror within the ranks of the proletariat. But this is another aspect of the matter, and serves only to demonstrate how futile the supposed opposition between fascism and parliamentary democracy really is – an inconsistency that is, in fact, confirmed by fascism’s own electoral activity.
Becoming an electoral party is hardly a flight of the eagle. One does not need to solve the difficult problem of drawing up a «new» programme to do so. And indeed, fascism will never be able to lay out its reason for existing in programmatic terms, nor form a coherent consciousness, because it is the product of a split between programme and consciousness within a class. If it were to speak in the name of a doctrine, it would have to fall back within the framework of traditional liberalism, which has entrusted it with the task of violating its own theory «for external use», in order to reserve for itself the right to go on preaching it.
Thus, fascism was unable to define itself at the Rome Congress – nor will it ever be able to (without, for that matter, needing to renounce its existence or the exercise of its function), because its formula of constitution is: all organisation, no ideology – just as, in dialectical contrast, the formula of the liberal party is: all ideology, no organisation.
It would be most interesting, having briefly shown how the split between doctrine and organisation is characteristic of the movements of a declining class, to highlight how the synthesis of ideology and organisation – approached through a rigorously realist and historical lens – is the mark of revolutionary movements on the advance. And thus to conclude with a note of hope: that when one knows the adversary – even the very reasons for their strength – better than they do themselves, and when one’s own strength is grounded in a solid consciousness of one’s objectives, then one cannot fail to count on ultimate victory over them.
Notes:
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At the Second National Congress of the Fascists, held in Rome from 7 to 10 November 1921, the National Fascist Party (PNF) was founded. 30 000 fascists had gathered in the capital and, to celebrate, once again marched through the city, leaving 5 dead and 120 injured. Following the murder of a railway worker on 9 November 1921, the Roman proletariat called a general strike, which neither the government nor a fascist ultimatum managed to break. The strike continued until 14 November — four days after the end of the fascist congress. The programme of the PNF, adopted at the congress, was only published on 27 November.
